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Abstract 
In this paper we present an analysis of the commodification of knowledge and information in 
contemporary capitalism. We provide a consistent account of how information as a 
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literature and present some empirical estimates of the magnitudes of knowledge-rents.  
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Introduction 
The commodification of knowledge and information has been an undeniable 
feature of our economic system. Copyrights, patents, and intellectual property rights 
have proliferated worldwide in the past decades (OECD 2013). The commodity form 
thus appears to spare nothing and no one. 
At every point in time in the history of capitalism when the commodity form 
took hold of a new economic object, a profound transformation would ensue. When the 
commodity form took hold of land, capitalist land rents emerged. When the commodity 
form took hold of labor power, wage labor and wages emerged. When the commodity 
form took hold of capital, interest-bearing capital emerged. Now we claim that when 
the commodity form took hold of knowledge and information, knowledge-rents 
emerged. 
In this paper we present an analysis of the commodification of knowledge and 
information in contemporary capitalism. Our approach aims primarily at developing 
Marxist theory so that it can face the new challenges posed by the existence of 
commodified information. In the 19th century Marx himself developed some deep 
insights on the future of science and information as productive forces within capitalism. 
Marx, however, had not yet experienced the vast and profound commodification of 
knowledge as we do nowadays. This fact bears consequences for the Marxist tradition, 
and it is our current task to provide a consistent account of how information as a 
commodity effects the workings of both capitalism and of Marxist theory.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we will critically revisit Marx’s 
own writings on the commodification of knowledge and how the immaterial labor 
hypothesis initially interpreted these writings. In revisiting Marx’s insights on the roles 
of science and the “general intellect” we will be able to see how he foresaw the 
production and distribution of wealth in a future stage of capitalism. The immaterial 
labor hypothesis originally raised the argument that capitalism has been going through a 
structural shift by relying ever more on immaterial commodities produced during non-
labor time. The hypothesis of a supposed change in the nature of both labor and 
commodities began to question abstract labor as the substance of value, and as a 
consequence it called into question the analytical validity of Marx’s value theory.  
Second, we present our own approach in response to the challenges raised by the 
immaterial labor hypothesis. We introduce new Marxist categories with the explicit 
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purpose of theorizing the emergence of commodified information: knowledge-
commodities with zero value, knowledge-rents, and knowledge-lords. Crucial to our 
argument is Marx’s distinction between production and reproduction time, and between 
productive and unproductive activity. Our own approach, we claim, coherently 
integrates Marx’s value theory with the transformation of knowledge and information 
into commodities. Third, we analyze the more recent contributions on this subject 
within the Marxist literature and present some empirical estimates of the magnitudes of 
knowledge-rents. We then conclude with some final remarks on artificial intelligence 
and the potential limits to the Marxist theory of value. 
 
Cognitive Capitalism and the Immaterial Labor Hypothesis 
 In an insightful passage in the 1857-1858 Grundrisse, a passage that did not 
reappear afterwards in any edition of Capital, Marx has an intriguing comment on the 
impact of technology and science on the limits of value as the form of wealth in 
capitalism. He explicitly posits that labor time is the measure of value. But then 
acknowledges that technology and science applied to production progressively render 
labor time a miserable measure of wealth. It is a lengthy passage but well worth quoting 
in full: 
But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes 
to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the 
power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose “powerful 
effectiveness” is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent 
on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the 
progress of technology, or the application of this science to production. […] 
Real wealth manifests itself, rather – and large industry reveals this – in the 
monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, and its product, as 
well as in the qualitative imbalance between labour, reduced to a pure 
abstraction, and the power of the production process it superintends. […] In this 
transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the 
time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general 
productive power … which appears as the great foundation-stone of production 
and of wealth. The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is 
based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-
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scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the 
great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, 
and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value. […] 
Capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labour 
time to a minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side, as sole 
measure and source of wealth. Hence it diminishes labour time in the necessary 
form so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence posits the superfluous in 
growing measure as a condition – question of life or death – for the necessary. 
On the one side, then, it calls to life all the powers of science and of nature, as of 
social combination and of social intercourse, in order to make the creation of 
wealth independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it. On the other 
side, it wants to use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces 
thereby created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the 
already created value as value. […] The development of fixed capital indicates 
to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of 
production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social 
life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been 
transformed in accordance with it. (Marx [1858]1973:705-706 – emphasis in the 
original) 
 
 This passage from the 1857-1858 Grundrisse was unknown to readers until its 
publication in 1939. In the 1990s it then became the basis for the immaterial labor 
hypothesis of André Gorz, Toni Negri, Michael Hardt, and Maurizio Lazzarato. The 
core idea of this hypothesis is that technological progress makes labor time an 
inadequate measure of value, for the “general intellect” depends ever more on what is 
produced during non-labor time. These authors identify the “transformation” that Marx 
alludes to as the transition from an industry-based to a service-based economy. This 
transition from industry to services is, in their understanding, the limit to value theory 
grounded on labor time. 
Negri (1991), Hardt and Negri (2001; 2004) and Lazzarato (2006) have put forth 
the argument that immaterial labor has modified the forms under which capitalist 
production takes place. Immaterial labor, they claim, produces immaterial products 
such as knowledge, information, ideas, images, affection etc. The qualities and specific 
characteristics of immaterial production tend to transform the labor process and even 
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society itself as a whole. In contrast to agriculture and industry, immaterial labor 
emerges in the service sector and does not produce tangible goods. Immaterial labor 
blurs the distinction between work and non-work time and changes the nature of labor 
time from quantitative to qualitative.  
Gorz ([2003] 2010) developed a similar set of ideas under his notion of cognitive 
capitalism. According to Gorz, current production relations are more tied to the 
complex and unmeasurable dimensions of human capital than to the former tangible 
forms of fixed capital. This replacement of fixed capital by human capital occurs 
because capitalism has gradually subordinated to the profit motive the knowledge, the 
science, and the arts developed during non-work time. Gorz ([2003] 2010) also 
differentiates between the present post-Fordist worker and the former industry worker 
still attached to the assembly line. The worker typical of Fordism is an appendix to 
material production and its work time is measured in hours of repetitive physical effort.  
The post-Fordist worker, on the contrary, is known for the qualitative aspects of its 
labor, for its knowledge and skills, for its behavior and improvisation, for its 
imaginative and cooperative capabilities mostly nurtured outside of the workplace.  
The main argument that Hardt, Negri, Lazzarato, and Gorz have raised against 
Marxist value theory is that abstract labor is no longer the substance of value.  The 
profound changes that immaterial labor has introduced into the nature of labor and 
production ended up displacing labor time as the internal regulating mechanism of 
capitalism. Immaterial labor, these authors claim, creates immaterial commodities 
whose values cannot be measured by the labor time required for their production. The 
valorization of value now depends less on unpaid labor time and hence more on the 
scientific knowledge and skills developed during non-labor time. 
Along similar lines, Fausto (2002) and Prado (2005) have suggested that 
present-day capitalism is developing under the post-large industry form, in reference to 
a “third moment” that succeeds manufacturing and the large industry that Marx 
theorized in Capital. The crucial feature of post-large industry is that knowledge itself 
becomes the core engine of production. As capital makes labor time increasingly 
irrelevant for accumulation, it modifies the way in which capital subjugates labor within 
and outside the production process. If previous forms of capitalism led to the formal and 
real subordination of labor to capital, capitalism now achieves a higher stage with the 
intellectual subordination of labor to capital.  
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Virno (2007) and Vercellone (2007) have also developed the idea that in 
cognitive capitalism the general intellect operates as a sublation of the real 
subordination of labor to capital. In this regard, Vercellone makes an important remark 
on the potential confusion between the “immaterial” and the “cognitive”: 
 
I insist upon the two terms “immaterial” and “cognitive” because the concept of 
immaterial labour, when used by itself to characterise the present change in 
labour, is, in my opinion, insufficient and imprecise. The essential trait of the 
present transformation in labour is not limited to its many immaterial 
dimensions or, more precisely, those of its products. It can above all be found in 
the reappropriation of the cognitive dimensions of work by living labour, with 
respect to all material and immaterial activity (Vercellone 2007, p.16).1 
 
The concept of immaterial labor poses a theoretical challenge to Marxist theory. 
If abstract labor is no longer the substance of value then value has lost both its internal 
measure in labor time and its role in regulating production and exchange. One crucial 
consequence of value losing its internal measure in labor time is that the price system 
becomes more arbitrary and dependent on non-economic factors such as monopoly 
rights.  
In the next section we address these concerns and show how it is possible, and 
logically consistent, to remain within the Marxist theory of value while concomitantly 
acknowledging the recent transformations in capitalism. 
 
Knowledge-Commodities and Knowledge-Rents 
In a more recent analysis, Teixeira and Rotta (2012), Rotta and Teixeira (2016), 
and Rotta (2018) propose a solution to the theoretical challenge inherent to the concept 
of immaterial labor. In these studies we conceptualize the role of commodified 
knowledge but we do so within Marx’s value theory, without rejecting abstract labor as 
the substance of value.  
In this regard it is crucial to distinguish between production and reproduction in 
the determination of value and socially necessarily labor time. Marx begins Capital at a 
very high level of abstraction, a stage in his theoretical exposition at which we only find 
                                                          
1 For a critique of this approach see Smith (2013). 
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the production of commodities. Growth, reproduction, and inter-capitalist competition 
are not yet explicitly (even though they are implicitly) included in the analysis2. But as 
soon as Marx approaches a more concrete level of analysis he progressively introduces 
the conditions of capital reproduction. At this point, once reproduction comes to the 
forefront of the theoretical exposition, there begins an important shift within Marx’s 
value theory.  
At the initial higher level of abstraction, in which only production is featured, 
commodity production determines the magnitude of values. But once reproduction is 
explicitly brought into the picture at a more concrete level of analysis, value is then 
determined by the conditions of commodity reproduction. The Marxist theory of value 
is fundamentally reliant on the difference between the production and the reproduction 
of commodities. Because of its undue focus on the very first chapters of Capital, the 
Marxist tradition has misunderstood how reproduction (not production) determines 
value and socially necessary labor time. 
Once the reproduction of capital is explicitly brought into the analysis, Marx 
posits that what determines the value of any commodity is not the socially necessary 
labor time required for its production but the socially necessary labor time required for 
its re-production.  
For example, from Capital I: 
 
But in addition to the material wear and tear, a machine also undergoes what we 
might call a moral depreciation. It loses exchange-value, either because 
machines of the same sort are being produced more cheaply than it was, or 
because better machines are entering into competition with it. In both cases, 
however young and full of life the machine may be, its value is no longer 
determined by the necessary labour-time actually objectified in it, but by the 
labour-time necessary to reproduce either it or the better machine. It has 
therefore been devalued to a greater or lesser extent. (Marx [1887]1990:528 − 
emphasis added) 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Fausto (1987a; 1987b) theorizes this distinction between implicit and explicit, or between presupposed 
and posited determinations as Marx moves from more abstract to more concrete levels of analysis.  
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From Capital II: 
 
Just as with any other commodity, so in the case of labour-power, too, its value 
is determined by the amount of labour needed to reproduce it. […] wages are the 
value of the commodity labour-power, and the latter can be determined (like the 
value of any other commodity) by the labour needed for its reproduction. (Marx 
[1893]1992, p.458-459 − emphasis added) 
 
In Capital III Marx pointed to "the great difference in costs between the first 
construction of a new machine and its reproduction" ([1894]1994:199), and then 
claimed that: 
 
Once machines, factory buildings or any other kind of fixed capital have reached 
a certain degree of maturity, so that they remain unchanged for a long while at 
least in their basic construction, a further devaluation takes place as a result of 
improvements in the methods of reproduction of this fixed capital. The value of 
machines, etc. now falls not because they are quickly supplanted or partially 
devalued by newer, more productive machines, etc., but because they can now 
be reproduced more cheaply. (Marx [1894]1994:209 − emphasis added) 
 
Fluctuations in the rate of profit that are independent of changes in either the 
capital's organic components or its absolute magnitude are possible only if the 
value of the capital advanced, whatever might be the form - fixed or circulating - 
in which it exists, rises or falls as a result of an increase or decrease in the 
labour-time necessary for its reproduction, an increase or decrease that is 
independent of the capital already in existence. The value of any commodity - 
and thus also of the commodities which capital consists of - is determined not by 
the necessary labour-time that it itself contains, but by the socially necessary 
labour-time required for its reproduction. This reproduction may differ from the 
conditions of its original production by taking place under easier or more 
difficult circumstances. (Marx [1894]1994:237-238 − emphasis added) 
 
Apart from all the accidental circumstances, a large part of the existing capital is 
always being more or less devalued in the course of the reproduction process, 
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since the value of commodities is determined not by the labor-time originally 
taken by their production, but rather by the labor-time that their reproduction 
takes, and this steadily decreases as the social productivity of labor develops. At 
a higher level of development of social productivity, therefore, all existing 
capital, instead of appearing as the result of a long process of capital 
accumulation, appears as the result of a relatively short reproduction period. 
(Marx [1894]1994:522 − emphasis added) 
 
In the case of commodified knowledge, Marx’s reasoning is pushed to its limit: 
once initially produced as commodities, knowledge and information tend to require no 
labor time to be further reproduced. They become knowledge-commodities with zero 
value and the ownership of them gives rise to knowledge-rents. Examples of 
knowledge-commodities are all sorts of commodified data, computer software, chemical 
formulas, patented information, recorded music, copyrighted compositions and movies, 
and monopolized scientific knowledge. Mokyr (2002) prefers to call it the “useful 
knowledge” of information, techniques, and instructions stored in technical artifacts.  
The owners of commodified knowledge, which are mostly private companies, 
are knowledge-lords, the primary appropriators of knowledge-rents. In a process 
analogous to the original enclosures of the commons in the 16th century we can now 
speak of the “new enclosures” that privatize knowledge. The new enclosures of the 21st 
century deny labor the free access to knowledge as much as the 16th century enclosures 
denied labor the access to free land (the commons) as a means of production. 
Because it produces no new value, the creation and ownership of commodified 
knowledge is actually an unproductive form of capital accumulation (Rotta 2018). 
Productive activities are those activities that create new surplus value, while 
unproductive activities are those that do not create new surplus value. Because 
knowledge and information can be reproduced without any labor, its production 
generates no value and hence no surplus value, and must therefore be classified as 
unproductive activity. 
A corollary of the above reasoning is that what Hardt, Negri, Lazzarato, and 
Gorz labeled as “immaterial labor” belongs mostly to the unproductive side of 
capitalism. Commodified knowledge and information have no value and hence cannot 
contain any surplus value. The profits that accrue to knowledge owners are knowledge-
rents that represent value drawn from other value-producing activities in the economy. 
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This is consistent with Marxist value theory and thus cannot be an argument favoring 
the dismissal of labor time as the measure of value.  
The main theoretical misunderstanding of those who advocate the end of Marx’s 
theory of value is that they have not properly conceptualized the difference between 
production and re-production time, and neither the difference between productive and 
unproductive activity3. Even though the language is not completely clear, Marx gave us 
a hint of this reasoning: 
 
[The] product of mental labor – science – always stands far below its value, 
because the labor-time needed to reproduce it has no relation at all to the labor-
time required for its original production (Marx [1863]1988, Addenda to Vol. 1). 
Once discovered, the law of the deflection of a magnetic needle in the field of an 
electric current, or the law of the magnetization of iron by electricity, cost 
absolutely nothing. […] Science, generally speaking, costs the capitalist nothing, 
a fact that by no means prevents him from exploiting it (Marx [1887]1990:508). 
 
In Capital III Marx then considers the existence of use-values that require no 
labor to be reproduced: 
 
[The] use-value is the general bearer of the exchange-value, but not its cause. If 
the same use-value could be created without labor, it would have no exchange-
value, yet it would have the same useful effect as ever (Marx [1894]1994:786). 
 
It is, nonetheless, crucial to distinguish between the knowledge-commodity itself 
and other tangible and non-tangible commodities that it might be attached to. In certain 
cases the knowledge-commodity is traded (sold or licensed) per se. Examples are when 
customers and companies purchase the license to use software, or when a company pays 
the royalties required to use a specific drug formula. But in other cases the knowledge-
commodity can only be traded if bundled together with another commodity. This 
situation leads to a potential theoretical confusion if we do not properly distinguish the 
knowledge-commodity itself from the other commodities bundled together with it.  
                                                          
3 Smith (2013) further criticizes the immaterial labor hypothesis for not properly considering the 
distinction between wealth and value in Marxist theory. 
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A few examples might clarify this instance. When a band performs a live concert 
its fans must pay for the entrance tickets. The ticket price covers the costs of all the 
inputs used such as the musical and technical equipment necessary for a live concert. 
The ticket price also covers the compensation of the productive labor of the musicians 
performing live to the public. However, the musicians are playing copyrighted 
compositions, and this is where the knowledge-rents arise. The copyrighted songs are 
knowledge-commodities and a share of the concert revenues are actually payments for 
the knowledge-rents associated with these songs. Hence, what we call a concert is in 
fact a bundle of several commodities, among them knowledge-commodities like 
musical compositions. The live performance is a combination of the productive labor of 
musicians and technical staff, plus the unproductive labor of those who composed the 
songs in the first place. If recorded, the video of the concert itself can be sold afterwards 
as a knowledge-commodity with zero value in a DVD or via Internet streaming. 
When you buy a smartphone, part of the phone price covers the production costs 
of the physical components. But another part of the price remunerates the patented 
design and the copyrighted software stored in the memory. The copyrighted parts of the 
phone are therefore knowledge-commodities, and the revenues associated with these 
specific components are knowledge-rents. This implies that your smartphone is in fact a 
combination of more than one commodity. A share of the phone price pays for the 
productive labor of those workers making the physical components. Another share of 
the phone price pays for the knowledge-rents, out of which the knowledge-lords pay for 
the unproductive labor of those workers making the design and the software4.  
Even fixed capital in the form of machines and equipment are combinations of 
different commodities. Suppose that a company takes ten years to develop a new type of 
machine capable of performing a very precise process. The physical machine does need 
labor time to the reproduced, and hence it contains value. But the copyrighted design 
and the copyrighted blueprint of the machine are the knowledge-commodities inherently 
attached to the machine itself. The same goes for any software used to operate this 
machine. This copyrighted knowledge is the knowledge-commodity that gives rise to 
knowledge-rents. Therefore, knowledge-commodities and knowledge-rents are present 
even in fixed forms of capital like machines and equipment. The physical part of this 
                                                          
4  Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick (2011) estimate the production costs of iPhones and iPads in 2010. They 
find that the cost of physical materials in iPhone 4 represents only 22% of the final retail price, while 
labor costs amount to only 5.3%. They do not, however, attempt to estimate the size of the knowledge-
rents. 
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fixed capital suffers both use-value depreciation and value (moral) depreciation, such 
that the machine gradually transfers (and hence loses) its value to the output. But the 
copyrighted part of this fixed capital does not have value and the payments associated to 
it are knowledge-rents. 
Marx’s theory of ground rent applies only to agriculture (Fine 1979; Harvey 
2006:349-357; Rigi 2014). But we can now draw on his insights to claim the existence 
of four categories of knowledge-rents: 
 
(i) Monopoly Rent: Because of intellectual property rights the owner of 
information is able to price (the use of) its knowledge-commodities above their zero 
value, hence extracting a monopoly rent from its users. The intellectual property rights 
transform a non-scarce commodity into one that is artificially scarce. The monopoly 
rent exists regardless if the user of the knowledge-commodity is a final consumer or a 
company using it as an input. If the owner of the knowledge-commodity sells not its use 
rights but the actual ownership, then the price of the knowledge-commodity is the 
expected discounted stream of future knowledge-rents. 
(ii) Differential Rent type I (DR-1): Each knowledge-commodity gives rise to 
different levels of productivity for the companies using them as inputs. If certain 
companies use a particular software to enhance their productivity, for example, these 
privileged companies will obtain DR-1. The software gives them a concrete productive 
differential. But if all companies use the same software, the productive differential is 
eroded and DR-1 ceases to exist. This is analogous to lands with different levels of 
fertility. 
(iii) Differential Rent type II (DR-2): Companies using knowledge-commodities as 
inputs do so but with different amounts of capital intensity. If the organic composition 
of capital across companies that use the software are not the same, even if all of them 
use the same software, DR-2 will emerge. 
(iv) Absolute Rent: Absolute rent would exist only if knowledge-commodities had 
value and were produced within a specific sector protected by intellectual property 
rights and with a lower organic composition of capital then the rest of the economy. 
Unlike monopoly rent, which draws from the global pool of surplus value, absolute rent 
draws from the surplus value in a particular sector of production (like land rents in the 
agricultural sector). Because these conditions are not satisfied in the case of knowledge-
commodities, absolute knowledge-rents are implausible. 
[12] 
 
As Teixeira and Rotta (2012) and Rotta (2018) demonstrated, it is empirically 
verifiable that present-day capitalism is indeed becoming more dependent on the 
existence of rents such as land-rents and knowledge-rents. In fact, the expansion of 
unproductive activities and of rentier forms of capital is exactly what Marx had 
theorized and foreseen in the development of capitalism. There is still no need to reject 
labor as the substance of value and hence no need to reject the Marxist theory of value. 
On the contrary, the rise of rentier activities and of other types of unproductive activity 
is exactly what Marx had conceptualized through his notion of value autonomization 
(Rotta and Teixeira 2016). 
In the next section we turn to the more recent developments in the Political 
Economy literature regarding the roles of knowledge and immaterial labor. 
 
The Commodification of Knowledge and Information: The Recent 
Literature 
 The Political Economy literature on the commodification of knowledge and 
information has been growing steadily in the past decades. It seems that the scholarship 
is converging towards the idea that the production of knowledge does not create new 
value and hence that knowledge-rents should be theorized as appropriations of the total 
surplus value produced in the economy. In this section we highlight a few but important 
recent advances made in the literature. 
Foley (2013) draws from the Classical Political Economy distinction between 
productive and unproductive activities to claim that commodified information contains 
no value and that its ownership gives rise to intellectual property rents. The unique 
feature of commodified information is that, unlike the case of land rents in which the 
same soil can be used for only one crop at a time, the same piece of information can be 
used by multiple parties concomitantly. Unlike land, knowledge is non-rival and hence 
its owner can extract rents multiple times over from costless copies of the same 
commodity. These rents, Foley argues, are part of a pool of surplus value generated in 
capitalist production though they have no direct relation to the exploitation of 
productive workers in themselves. The production of knowledge and the associated 
intellectual property rights allow unproductive capitalists to grab a share of the global 
pool of surplus value without directly contributing to it. Foley also notes that despite 
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being classified as an unproductive activity, knowledge creation can indirectly raise the 
productivity of labor in productive activities.  
On this same issue, Foley has a very good passage on how the creation of 
surplus value is actually an unintended by-product of the struggle to appropriate (not 
necessarily to produce) surplus value. Which implies that, in capitalism, economic 
growth is an unintended by-product of the pursuit of profits: 
 
[The] global pool of surplus value emerges from the social relations of 
capitalism as an unintended by-product of the competition to appropriate surplus 
value. Its magnitude is an emergent and contingent phenomenon beyond the 
influence of any individual capitalist, responsive only to broad political, cultural, 
and social factors. The immediate competitive challenge for all capitals is the 
appropriation of a larger share of this pool of surplus value. Some modes of 
appropriation indirectly contribute to increasing the size of the pool of surplus 
value, but many, including a wide variety of methods of generating rents, do not. 
There are some self-correcting mechanisms built into the social relations of 
capitalism ... If, for example, capitalists relentlessly shift capital from the 
generation of surplus value to the unproductive pursuit of the appropriation of 
surplus value, sooner or later profit rates in productive sectors will rise and 
profit rates in unproductive sectors will fall, according to the general law of 
competition (Foley 2013:261). 
  
Jeon (2011) further notes that in the Marxist tradition in South Korea there has 
been an intense debate between those who think that knowledge-commodities have 
value and those who think otherwise. Among those who believe that knowledge-
commodities have value, the main argument is that the fixed capital and all the costs 
behind the production of the very first unit (the “mold”) must be taken into account into 
the unit values of the output. Hence, if this hypothesis is correct, the value of 
knowledge-commodities is the average cost per unit produced inclusive of all sunk and 
fixed costs. Given the large expenditures with machinery, laboratories, and research and 
development that need to be spread out across all copies sold, the average cost of 
knowledge-commodities cannot be zero. But such an approach ignores Marx’s value 
theory grounded on reproduction time. As we have seen in the last section, Marx was 
very explicit about the fact that reproduction, not production, determines the value of 
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any commodity. Jeon (2011) also notes that in the group of Korean scholars that 
identify with the hypothesis that knowledge-commodities have zero value, there has 
been a convergence toward the idea that intellectual property rights do imply the 
existence of information rents. 
Starosta (2012) and Fuchs (2015) also disagree with the notion that knowledge-
commodities have zero value. These authors believe that value is determined in a 
similar way to average costs. And because average costs are the total costs (inclusive of 
fixed costs like plants and equipment) divided by the output, the value of knowledge-
commodities is not zero. Starosta warns against attempts of determining the values of 
commodities taken individually: 
 
[The] determination of the value of the individual commodity can no longer be 
considered in isolation but must be directly posited in its organic relation to the 
mass of commodities whose unity embodies the valorization of the capital 
invested. […] the total value is determined “first” and then shared out equally by 
each individual commodity, which now contains a proportional fraction of the 
former. […] the real determination of value actually transcends the isolated 
single commodity as such. […] Inasmuch as each single commodity embodies 
an equal fraction of the value of the product of capital as a whole, the 
comparison between the (exceptionally high) cost of production of the first 
article and (exceptionally low) cost of reproduction of the rest is rendered 
meaningless as far as their value-determinations are concerned. […] intellectual 
property rights do not force the exchange-value of software above its 
insignificantly small (or nonexistent) value … but mediate its full realization. 
[…] In this sense, there is no essential difference between cognitive 
commodities and “physical” ones beyond the aforementioned technicality of 
extending the legal regulation beyond the act of exchange proper and into the 
conditions of use (Starosta 2012:373-376). 
 
 Starosta argues that the total value of the entire output must be divided across 
each unit produced. This average cost approach to the determination of value is 
therefore an attempt to remain within the boundaries of Marx’s value theory, while at 
the same time rejecting the claims that Marx’s value theory has become obsolete in 
cognitive capitalism. Starosta cites passages from Capital, mostly drawn before Marx 
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explicitly introduces reproduction into the analysis, to corroborate his perspective. But 
ignores those that contradict his claims. What determines the value of any commodity is 
the labor time required to reproduce it. And this reproduction time bears no relation 
with the labor time originally required to create the commodity in the first place.  
Marx’s value theory based on reproduction time and, consequently, on moral 
depreciation (the change in the values of the existing stock of commodities) is much 
more nuanced than a simple average cost approach. The determination of value based 
on the socially necessary labor time to reproduce a commodity is, in fact, similar to 
current cost accounting practices. A closer inspection of Marx’s quotes in the previous 
section of this paper shows that moral depreciation: 
(i) Is the loss of value that, abstracting from the physical wear and tear (the use-
value depreciation), impacts the stock of all commodities, including those 
that have already been produced in the past; 
(ii) Can occur because of easier reproduction conditions on the supply side and 
also because of changes on the demand side; 
(iii) Can occur because reproduction time takes into account the immediate 
effects of new technologies on the obsolescence of already existing 
technologies;  
(iv) Can occur because of economies of scale that reduce reproduction costs as 
more output is produced, for a given technology. 
Contrary to average costs, reproduction time does not rely on the sunk and fixed 
costs originally employed in the production of the mold: “the value of the capital 
advanced … rises or falls as a result of an increase or decrease in the labour-time 
necessary for its reproduction, an increase or decrease that is independent of the capital 
already in existence” (Marx [1894]1994:237-238 − emphasis added). Reproduction 
time can thus fall to zero after the mold is produced regardless of the large amounts of 
fixed capital used in its conception. This immediate drop in reproduction time after the 
mold is created does not derive from a sudden fall in the average cost due to economies 
of scale. Moral depreciation is logically consistent only with a theory of value based not 
on average costs but on reproduction time. We do not have to claim, therefore, that 
knowledge-commodities have value in order to save Marx’s value theory. 
Starosta (2012) and Fuchs (2015, chapter 5; 2017) thus disagree with the notion 
that knowledge production is a type of unproductive activity. Our claim that knowledge 
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creation is an unproductive activity might indicate that the unproductive workers 
creating knowledge and information are not exploited. But this is definitely not the case: 
 
[A]ll capitalistically employed labor is exploited by capital, whether it is 
productive labor or unproductive labor. The rate of exploitation of each is their 
respective ratio of surplus labor time to necessary labor time. […] In the case of 
productive workers, their rate of exploitation is also the rate of surplus value, 
since their surplus labor time results in surplus value (Shaikh and Tonak 
1994:31). 
 
In Capital III Marx claims that by exploiting unproductive workers the 
unproductive capitalist grabs a share of the global pool of surplus value:  
 
It is only by way of its function in the realization of values that commercial 
capital functions as capital in the reproduction process, and therefore draws, as 
functioning capital, on the surplus-value that the total capital produces. For the 
individual merchant, the amount of his profit depends on the amount of capital 
that he can employ in this process, and he can employ all the more capital in 
buying and selling, the greater the unpaid labour of his clerks. The very function 
by virtue of which the commercial capitalist's money is capital is performed in 
large measure by his employees, on his instructions. Their unpaid labour, even 
though it does not create surplus-value, does create his ability to appropriate 
surplus-value, which, as far as this capital is concerned, gives exactly the same 
result; i.e. it is its source of profit. Otherwise the business of commerce could 
never be conducted in the capitalist manner, or on a large scale. Just as the 
unpaid labour of the worker creates surplus-value for productive capital directly, 
so also does the unpaid labour of the commercial employee create a share in that 
surplus-value for commercial capital. (Marx [1894]1994:407) 
 
Contrary to Fuchs’s approach, and drawing from Teixeira and Rotta (2012), Rigi 
(2014) builds on the concepts of knowledge-commodities and of knowledge-rents in 
order to analyze the distribution of surplus value among different forms of intellectual 
property such as copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets. Rigi rightfully 
claims that knowledge-rents cannot be conceptualized solely within national borders, 
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for the core countries are able to extract rents from the surplus value produced in 
peripheral regions of the globe. In a similar way, Seda-Irizarry and Bhattacharya (2017) 
conceptualize knowledge-rents at the level of global value chains, as rents might imply 
the transfer of surplus from non-capitalist modes of production in peripheral countries 
to the capitalist mode of production in core countries. 
Within the Marxist tradition, an early mention of a category akin to “knowledge-
rent” is from Ernest Mandel (1975:192) in his theory of “technological rents” as the 
surplus profits derived from monopolized innovations that reduce production costs. 
Haddad (1998) uses the term “knowledge-rents” more precisely to indicate the revenues 
whose origin lies in the labor of “knowledge workers” employed at private companies. 
Perelman (2003:305) and Zeller (2008) further establish a comparison between land 
property rights and patents. But despite their insights, these authors do not develop a 
consistent value theory of knowledge-rents as we do in Teixeira and Rotta (2012) and 
Rotta (2018).  
Zeller (2008), in particular, offers an attempt at theorizing information rents 
within a Marxist framework. He posits that intellectual property rights are similar to the 
enclosure of the commons in the time of primitive accumulation. But despite claiming 
explicitly that information rents are monopoly rents, Zeller does not engage into a 
discussion of whether or not commodified information has any value. Despite analogies 
to land rents and accumulation by dispossession, in his work there is no further 
theoretical development besides the claim of monopoly rents associated to patents. As 
we put forth, without a proper value theory of commodified information it is not 
possible to develop a consistent theory of information rents. Zeller (2008:97) seems to 
suggest that commodified knowledge does have value and that patents ensure the value 
of knowledge is realized.5 But if commodified information has value then the analogy 
with monopolized land and land rents is unclear.  
As Teixeira and Rotta (2012:456-459) explain, within a Marxist framework, 
interest is the form of revenue associated with loaned money or with licensed 
commodities that have value. Rent, on the contrary, is the form of revenue associated 
with commodities that do not have value. Borrowed money is an amount of value and 
hence is paid back with interest. Borrowed (i.e. leased) machines and equipment have 
                                                          
5 “Knowledge is a product of labor. But the problem lies in the fact that information and technology once 
produced are usually quite simple to reproduce, and therefore the realization of the exchange value is 
questioned” (Zeller 2008:97 – emphasis added). 
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value and hence the lease payments are interest payments. In the case of licensed 
knowledge there is no value being borrowed, and hence the payments associated with it 
are not interest but rents instead. Unworked land yields rents to its owner because 
unworked land requires no labor to be produced (because it is a free gift from nature) 
and thus contains no value. Without a consistent value theory, as Teixeira and Rotta 
(2012:456-459) develop, there is a great risk in conflating interest and rent. 
The Political Economy notion that knowledge has zero value is featured in 
mainstream Economics, albeit under a different value theory, as the zero marginal cost 
of knowledge (Duffy 2004). Shavell and van Ypersel (2001:545) note that this special 
feature of knowledge also applies to industries producing pharmaceuticals, software, 
movies, recorded music, books, and visual products. 
Rotta (2018) is one of the yet few empirical works that attempt to estimate the 
actual size of knowledge-rents and their evolution over time. Using input-output 
matrices and national income accounts for the United States from 1947 to 2011, Rotta 
(2018) arrives at aggregate and disaggregate estimates of Marxist categories for both 
productive and unproductive activities. The rise of knowledge-rents is just one 
dimension within the larger secular trend of rising unproductive activity. Unproductive 
activity has been growing at a fast pace in terms of incomes, fixed assets, and 
employment. The total income of unproductive activities quadrupled relative to the total 
value generated in productive activities during the 1947-2011 period. The estimates 
reveal that knowledge creation and finance have been the fastest growing unproductive 
activities both in terms of net income and capital stock. As percentage shares of the net 
income of all unproductive activity within the American economy, there has been 
substantial growth in the shares of finance and insurance from 14% to 23.2%, and also 
in knowledge and information rents from 7.9% to 17.4%. Finance and knowledge-rents 
combined have risen from 21.9% to 40.5% of the net income of all unproductive 
activity, hence nearly doubling in the postwar period. As percentage shares of the net 
capital stock in all unproductive activities, the fastest growth rates in shares have been 
in knowledge and information (from 0.8% to 5.0%) and in finance and insurance (from 
1.7% to 10.3%). Finance- and knowledge-related activities have grown their combined 
capital stocks six fold (or 502%) from 1947 to 2011 as a share of the total unproductive 
capital stock. 
Robbins (2009) provides detailed estimates of corporate income of United States 
corporations from the use of intellectual property, including royalties and licensing fees. 
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The evidence indicates that these transactions have been growing rapidly at 11% on 
average per year from 1994 to 2004. Robbins (2009)’s work provides further discussion 
on how intangible assets and the revenues associated with them impact official GDP 
estimates. The Bureau of Economic Analysis in the US, for example, now plans to 
include investment in intangible assets as part of GDP. 
The concepts of knowledge-commodities and of knowledge-rents can also unify 
two important branches of Marxism: the cultural industry (including digital media) and 
value theory. As Fredric Jameson noticed back in 1984, the Marxist tradition had not 
yet been able, by then, to integrate “cultural and informational commodities” with the 
labor theory of value. Our approach, we argue, bridges this gap in the Political 
Economy scholarship: 
 
This description is also quite consistent with the Frankfurt School’s conception 
of the “culture industry” and the penetration of commodity fetishism into those 
realms of the imagination and the psyche which had, since classical German 
philosophy, always been taken as some last impregnable stronghold against the 
instrumental logic of capital. What remains problematical about such 
conceptions – and about mediatory formulations such as that of Guy Debord, for 
whom “the image is the last stage of commodity reification” – is of course the 
difficulty of articulating cultural and informational commodities with the labor 
theory of value, the methodological problem of reconciling an analysis in terms 
of quantity and in particular of labor time (or of the sale of labor power in so 
many units) with the nature of “mental” work and of nonphysical and 
noncomensurable “commodities” of the type of informational bits or indeed of 
media or entertainment “products” (Jameson 1984:xi − emphasis added). 
 
In this regard, Fuchs (2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; also Fisher and Fuchs 2015) has 
done some interesting work on the production of knowledge and information in social 
media like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Myspace, WordPress etc. His argument is 
that the users themselves are producing the content of the information commodities. 
Social media companies appropriate and commodify user-generated content without 
paying for the labor time required to produce it. In return, these companies offer their 
services without charge. Fuchs thus labels these users as prosumers: consumers that 
actually produce the content that they themselves consume. Social media companies are 
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responsible for proving the digital platform, thus encoding all the content, and then 
receiving fees from advertisers.  
In spite of our theoretical disagreements in terms of value theory, Fuchs does 
offer an interesting hypothesis, namely that on social media it is the users (the 
prosumers) themselves that generate the information that is then gathered and 
commodified by the companies developing the online platforms. Wikipedia, the biggest 
encyclopedia in the history of humankind, would be another great example of user-
generated content, even though in this particular case there is no profit motive and 
hence knowledge is not commodified. The question that remains open is if, once 
produced by the users themselves, these information commodities on social media still 
require labor time to be further reproduced. From our perspective, this user-generated 
content online necessitates labor to be produced but, once produced, necessitates no 
further labor to be reproduced. Companies like Google and Facebook can commodify 
the online content of their users but it is still a commodity with zero value. Our 
argument does not negate the possibility that the users are somehow exploited when 
they generate the content online that is later on gathered, processed, and commodified. 
It does question, however, the notion that this online content on social media has value. 
Our understanding is that commodified information, because of its effortless 
reproduction, has always zero value regardless of who produces it. 
Overall, the Political Economy of knowledge commodification has not yet 
reached a final consensus on the status of knowledge-commodities as commodities with 
zero value. But despite some theoretical disagreements, the recent literature does seem 
to be converging toward the idea that knowledge creation produces no value and no 
surplus value. The scholarship has also been able to bridge the gap between the Marxist 
theory of value and the cultural industry. The next step in terms of research agenda 
points to more empirical analyses on the sizes and impacts of knowledge-rents, both 
within and between countries. 
 
Final Remarks 
 Knowledge-rents have proliferated and represent shares drawn from the global 
pool of surplus value. But unlike land and land rents, the unique feature of information 
(that of a sui generis commodity reproducible without labor time) allows its owners to 
extract knowledge-rents from multiple parties at the same time. 
[21] 
 
 The immaterial labor hypothesis initially raised concerns regarding the nature of 
immaterial commodities and immaterial labor. In its critique of Marx’s value theory it 
failed, nonetheless, to notice the crucial distinction between production and 
reproduction time. The immaterial labor hypothesis also inappropriately ignored the 
distinction between productive and unproductive activities that is central to Political 
Economy. 
This does not mean, of course, that the Marxist theory of value faces no limits. 
As a theory that is contingent on a specific mode of production and on a specific 
historical moment, the Marxist value theory will make evident its own constrains. One 
possible case, even still within the capitalist mode of production, is that of artificial 
intelligence (AI). In Marxist theory, only direct human labor creates new value. 
Machines and equipment transfer their values to the output but do not add any new 
value to it. AI could challenge this idea, for it is a non-labor input that does create a new 
output not previously conceived, foreseen, or planned by human labor. AI implies that 
fixed capital itself has productive and creative powers, independent of the human labor 
originally used to program it in the first place. 
In any case, the more recent literature seems to be converging towards the idea 
that knowledge-commodities have led to the emergence of information rents, and that 
these information rents are a key feature of contemporaneous capitalism. Empirical 
estimates indicate that knowledge-rents have been rising both as a share of the total 
income of unproductive activities and also relative to the total value created in 
productive activities. 
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